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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY 
H. • • not to an arms race but to a peace 
race- to advance together step by step, 
stage by stage, until general and complete 
disarmament has been achieved." 
PRESIDENT KENNEDY 
September 25, 1961 
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Washington 25, D.C. - Price 30 cents 
Statement by President Kennedy 
Press Conference, April 18, 1962 
The United States has today tabled at Geneva an outline 
of every basic provision of a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament in a peaceful world. It provides a blueprint of 
our position on general and complete disarmament as well as 
elaboration of the nature, sequence, and timing of specific 
disarmament measures. 
This outline of a treaty represents the most comprehensive 
and specific series of proposals the United States or any other 
country has ever made on disarmament. In addition to 
stating the objectives and principles which should govern 
agreements for disarmament, the document calls for the 
grouping of individual measures in three balanced and safe-
guarded stages. We are hopeful through the give-and-take of 
the conference table this plan will have a constructive influence 
upon the negotiations now in progress. 
I want to stress that with this plan the United States is 
making a major effort to achieve a breakthrough on disarma-
ment negotiations. We believe that the nations represented at 
Geneva have a heavy responsibility to lay the foundations for 
a genuinely secure and peaceful world starting through a 
reduction in arms. 
Foreword 
An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free 
from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of arma-
ments, in which the use of force has been subordinated to the 
rule of law, and in which international adjustments to a chang-
ing world are achieved peacefully. Today, in a world -riven 
by dangerous tensions and mistrust, the attainment of this goal 
necessit,ates continuing and patient efforts to achieve the pro-
gressive reduction of national warmaking capabilities in such a 
manner as to increase the security of all nations. Thus, re-
sponsible arms control and disarmament proposals cannot 
be directed toward the attainment of unilateral political or 
military advantage. They must be fully responsive to the 
legitimate security interests of all nations. 
On the basis of these considerations, President Kennedy on 
September 25, 1961, presented to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations the "United States Program for General and 
Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." To provide a 
more precise statement of the United States approach to dis-
armament and the manner in which that approach should be 
implemented, the United States on April 18, 1962, presented 
to the conference of the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament, 
meeting in Geneva, an "Outline of Basic rrovisions of a Treaty 
on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." 
Although not a draft treaty, the "Outline" elaborates and ex-
tends the proposals of September 25 and provides in specific 
terms a substantial basis for the negotiation of arms control 
and disarmament treaty obligations. 
The principal provisions of the United States Outline are de-
scribed in the summary that follows. The complete text of 
the Outline begins on page 5. 
Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on 
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World 
SUMMARY 
Principles and Process of Disarmament 
Disarmament would be implemented progressively and in a balanced 
manner so that at no stage could any state or group of states obtain 
military advantage. Compliance with obligations would be effec-
tively verified. As national armaments were reduced, the United 
Nations would be progressively strengthened. 
Disarmament would be accomplished in three stages-the first to 
be carried out in 3 years; the second, also in 3 years; and the third, 
as promptly as possible within an agreed period of time. Stage I 
would be initiated by the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
other agreed states. All militarily: significant states would partici-
pate in Stage II; and all states possessing armaments and armed 
forces, in Stage III. 
Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take 
place upon a determination that all undertakings in the preceding 
stage had been carried out and that all preparations for the next 
stage had been made. 
Disarmament Measures 
A. ARMAMENTS. During Stage I, inventories of major categories 
of both nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments would 
be reduced by 30 percent. Fixed launching pads would be reduced 
with associated missiles. Half of the remaining inventories would be 
eliminated during Stage II, and final reductions would be made in 
Stage III. Upon the completion of Stage III, states would have at 
their disposal only agreed types of nonnuclear armaments for forces 
required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security 
of citizens. 
Production of armaments during Stfl,ge I would be)imited t.o agreed 
allowances and would be compensated for by the destruction of addi-
tiqnal armaments to the end that reductions would not be impaired. 
In Stage II, production of armanlents would be halted except for 
parts for maintenance of retained armaments. Any further produc-
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tion of national armaments would be ended in Stage III except for pro-
duction of agreed types of nonnuclear armnments for internal forces. 
Military research, development, and testing would be subject t.o 
increasing limitations .during the disarmament process. During Stage 
III, appropriate action would be taken to insure that new scientific 
discoveries and technological inventions of military significance were 
not used for military purposes. 
B. ARMED FORCES. Force levels of the United States and Soviet 
Union would be reduced to 2.1 million at the end of Stage I. Half 
of the remaining forces of these two states would be disbanded during 
Stage II, and final reductions wou1d be made in Stage III. Other 
states would also progressively reduce their force levels. By the end 
of Stage III, states would have at their disposal only those agreed 
forces and related organizational arrangements required to maintain 
internal order and protect the personal security of citizens. 
C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Production of fissionable materials for use 
in nuclear weapons wou1d be halted in Stage I, and limitations would 
be imposed on the production of fissionable materials for other pur-
poses. The availability of fissionable materials for use in nuclear 
weapo~s would be reduced during Stage I and subsequent stages by 
safeguarded transfers to nonnuclear weapons purposes. 
If nuclear weapons tests had not already been halted under effective 
international control, arrangements to this end would be undertaken 
in Stage I. States which had manufactured nuclear weapons would 
agree in Stage I not to transfer control over nuclear weapons to states 
which had not manufactured them or to assist such states in their 
manufacture. States which had not manufactured nuclear weapons 
would refrain from seeking them. Transfers of fissionable materials 
between states would be limited to peaceful purposes and would be 
safeguarded. 
Beginning in Stage II, nonnuclear components and assemblies of 
nuclear weapons would be destroyed and limitations would be im-
posed on further production or refabrication of nuclear weapons. At 
the end of Stage II, remaining nuclear weapons would be registered 
internationally to assist in verifying the fact that by the end of Stage 
III states would not have such weapons at t.heir disposal. 
D. OUTER SPACE. The placing of weapons of mass destruction in 
orbit would be prohibited in Stage I, and limitations would be im-
posed on the production, stockpiJing, and testing of boosters for space 
vehicles. States would support increased cooperation in peaceful 
uses of outer space. 
E. MILITARY BASES. Reduction of military bases, wherever they 
might be located, would be initiated in Stage II, and final reductions 
would be made in Stage III. 
F. MILITARY EXPENDITURES. Military expenditures would be re-
ported throughout the disarmament process. 
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Verification 
The verification of disarmament would be the responsibility of an 
International Disarmament Organization, which would be established 
within the framework of the United Nations. Reductions of arma-
ments and armed forces would be verified at agreed locations; and 
limitations on production, testing, and other specified activities, at 
declared locations. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and 
armed forces were not exceeded and that activities subject to limi-
tation or prohibition w'ere not being conducted clandestinely would 
be provided through arrangements which would relate the extent 
of inspection at any time to the amount of disarmament being 
undertaken and to the risk to the disarming states of possible vio-
lations. 
Such assurance might, for example, be accomplished through 
arrangements under 'which states would divide themselves into a 
number of zones through which inspection would be progressively 
extended. By the end of Stage III, when disarmament had been 
completed, all parts of the territory of states would have been in-
spected. 
Reduction of the Risk of War 
To promote confidence and reduce the risk of war during the 
disarmament process, states would, beginning in Stage I, give advance 
notification of major military movements and maneuvers, establish 
observation posts to report on concentrations and movements of 
military forces, and insure rapid and reliable communications among 
heads of governments and with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
An International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War 
would examine possible extensions and improvements of such measures 
as well as additional measures to reduce the risk of war through 
accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack. 
Arrangements for Keeping the Peace 
In Stage I, states would undertake obligations to refrain from the 
threat or use of force of any type contrary to the United Nations 
Charter. Throughout the three stages of disarmament, states would 
use all available means for the peaceful settlement of disputes, would 
seek to improve processes for this purpose, and would support meas-
ures to improve the capability of the United Nations to maintain 
international peace and security. 
A United Nations Peace Observation Corps would be established 
in Stage I, and a United Nations Peace Force, in Stage II. The 
United Nations Peace Force, which would be equipped with agreed 
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types of armaments and would be supplied agreed manpower by 
states, would be progressively strengthened until, in Stage III, it 
would be fully capable of insuring international security in a disarmed 
world. 
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Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on 
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World 
COMPLETE TEXT 
In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits 
the following outline of basic provisions of such a treaty. 
A. OBJECTIVES 
1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and 
war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and 
(b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the estab-
lishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by 
effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance 
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with 
with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for: 
(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establish-
ments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as 
well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses; 
(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological, 
and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production 
of such weapons; 
(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass 
destruction; 
(d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to 
organize the military efforts of states, cessation of military training, 
and closing of all military training institutions; 
(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures. 
3. To ensure that, at the completion of the program for general and 
complete dis arm amen t, states would have at their disposal only those 
non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are 
agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the 
personal security of citizens. 
4. To ensure that durinz and after implementation of general and 
complete disarmament, states also would support and provide agreed 
manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with 
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agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United 
Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms. 
5. To establish and provide for the effective operation of an Inter-
national Disarmament Organization within the framework of the 
United Nations for the purpose of ensuring that all obligations under 
the disarmament program would be honored and observed during and 
after implementation of general and complete disarmament; and to 
this end to ensure that the International Disarmament Organization 
and its inspectors would have unrestricted access without veto to all 
places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification. 
B. PRINCIPLES 
The guiding principles during the achievement of these objectives 
are: 
1. Disarnlament would be implemented until it is completed by 
stages to be carried out within specified time limits. 
2. Disarmanlent would be balanced so that at no stage of the 
implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain 
military advantage, and so that security would be ensured equally for 
all. 
3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would be effectively 
verified during and after their entry into force. Verification arrange-
ments would be instituted progressively as necessary to ensure 
throughout the disarmament process that agreed levels of armaments 
and armed forces were not exceeded. 
4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would 
be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to 
ensure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences 
as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation 
in common tasks for the benefit of mankind. 
5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take 
place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage had been 
implemented and verified and that any additional arrangements 
required for measures in the next stage were ready to operate. 
Introduction 
The Treaty would contain three stages designed to achieve a per-
manent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful 
world. The Treaty would enter into force upon the signature and rat-
ification of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and such other states as might be agreed. Stage II would 
begin when all militarily significant states had become Parties to 
6 
the. Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. 
Stage III would begin when all states possessing armed forces and 
armaments had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition 
requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and 
measures for keeping the peace would proceed progressively and 
proportionately beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty. 
Stage I 
Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and 
would be completed within three years from that date. 
During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake: 
1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out 
other agreed measures in the manner outlined below; 
2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon 
the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure the verification 
in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and 
3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through t'he 
measures outlined below. 
A. ARMAMENTS 
1. Reduction of Armaments 
a. Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage toward general 
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by 
thirty percent the armaments in each category listed in subparagraph 
b below. Except as adjustments for production would be permitted 
in Stage I in accordance with paragraph 3 below, each type of arma-
ment in the categories listed in subparagraph b would be reduced 
by thirty percent of the inventory existing at an agreed date. 
b. All types of armaments within agreed categories would be 
subject to reduction in Stage I (the followiJ;lg list of categories, and 
of types within categories, is illustrative) : 
(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 
kilograms or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or 
greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and sub-
marine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range 
of 300 kilometers or greater. 
(Within this category, the United States, for example, would 
declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft; Atlas missiles 
together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles to-
gether with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; Hound 
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Dog missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman 
missiles, which came within the category description, together with, 
where applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The declared 
inventory of types within the category by other Parties to the Treaty 
would be similarly detailed). 
(2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 
15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and those missiles not included 
in category (1) having a range between 300 kilometers and 5,000 
kilometers, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The 
Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category). 
(3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 
2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would declare their arma-
ments by types within the category). 
(4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) 
and air-to-surface aerodynanlic and ballistic missiles and free rockets 
having a range of between 10 kilometers and 300 kilometers, together 
with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare 
their armaments by types within the category). 
(5) Anti-missile missile systems, together with related fixed 
launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by 
types within the category). 
(6) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile systems, 
together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would 
declare their armaments by types within the category). 
(7) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by 
types within the category). 
(8) Armored cars and armored personnel carriers. (The 
Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category). 
(9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a 
caliber of 100 mm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their 
armaments by types within the category). 
(10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons 
or greater of the following classes: Aircraft carriers, battleships, 
cruisers, destroyer types and submarines. (The Parties would declare 
their armaments by types within the category). 
2. Method of Reduction 
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the reduction 
of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament Organi-
zation an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their 
armaments existing at the agreed date. 
b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each 
consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction to be made during 
Stage I would be carried out during each step. 
c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments 
to be eliminated during Stage I would be placed in depots under 
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supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. During 
the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be 
destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The 
number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting 
their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to 
thb Treaty. 
d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a 
Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organi-
zation would verify th~ foregoing reduction and would provide assur-
ance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels. 
3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities 
a. Production of all armaments listed in subparagraph b of para-
graph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances during Stage I 
and, by the beginning of Stage II, would be halted except for pro-
duction within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed 
retained armaments. 
b. The allowances would permit limited production in each of the 
categories of armaments listed in subparagraph b of paragraph 1 
above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production 
of armaments: 
(1) any armament produced within a category would be com-
pensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that cate-
gory to the end that the ten percent reduction in numbers in each 
category in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction in 
Stage I, would be achieved; and furthermore 
(2) in the case of armed combat aircraft having an empty weight 
of 15,000 kilograms or greater and of missiles having a range of 300 
kilometers or greater, the destructive capability of any such arma-
ments produced within a category would be <?ompensated for by the 
destruction of sufficient armaments within that category to the end 
that the ten percent reduction in destructive capability as well as 
numbers in each of these categories in each step, and the resulting 
thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved. 
c. Should a Party to the Treaty elect to reduce its production in 
any category at a more rapid rate than required by the allowances 
provided in subparagraph b above, that Party would be entitled to 
retain existing armaments to the extent of the unused portion of its 
production allowance. In any such instance, any armament so 
retained would be compensated for in the manner set forth in sub-
paragraph b (1) and, where applicable, b (2) above to the end that 
the ten percent reduction in numbers and, where applicable, destruc-
tive capability in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty 
percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved. 
d. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual 
quotas. 
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e. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in 
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and 
would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing 
measures were not conducted at undeclared locations. 
4. Additional Measures 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine unresolved 
questions relating to means of accomplishing in Stages II and III 
the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles 
of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In light 
of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrange-
ments concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. 
B. ARMED FORCES 
1. Reduction of Armed Forces 
Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and 
for other specified Parties to the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 
2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed 
exceptions, reduce their force levels t.o 100,000 or one pereent of their 
population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the 
force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence 
upon the entry into force of the Treaty. 
2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction 
Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel 
maintained by national governments in the following categories: 
a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel 
serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts. 
b. Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active 
duty as fixed by national law. 
c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other 
forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military 
mISSIon. 
3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces 
The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following 
manner: 
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing 
reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date. 
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b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, 
each having a duration of one year. During each step force levels 
would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels 
existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of 
Stage I. 
c. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the 
annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization 
would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that 
retained forces did not exceed agreed levels. 
4. Additional Measures 
The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing re-
ductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including pro-
c~dures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employment 
by military establishments would be in accordance with the objectives 
of the obligations respecting force levels. 
C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
1. Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons 
a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of fissionable 
materials for use in nuclear weapons. 
b. This measure would be carried out in the following manner: 
(1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International 
Disarmament Organization a declaration listing by name, location and 
production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of 
producing and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date. 
(2) Production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use 
in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The Parties to 
the Treaty would submit to the International. Disarnlament Organiza-
tion periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable 
materials which were still being produced at each facility. 
(3) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in 
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion would verify t.he foregoing measures at declared facilities and 
would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing 
limitations were not conducted at undeclared facilities. 
2. Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other Than Use in Nuclear 
Weapons 
a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use 
in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than 
use in nuclear weapons an agreed quantity of weapons-grade U-235 
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from past production. The purposes for which such materials would 
be used would be determined by the state to which the material 
belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear 
weapons. 
b. To ensure that the transferred materials were not used in nuclear 
weapons, such materials would be placed under safeguards and in-
spection by the International Disarmament Organization either in 
stockpiles or at the facilities in which they would be utilized for 
purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for such 
safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the annex on verifica-
tion. 
3. Transfer of Fissionable Materials Between States for Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy 
a. Any transfer of fissionable materials between states would be for 
purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject 
to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used 
in nuclear weapons. 
b. The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be 
developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. 
4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation 
of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree 
that: 
a. Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, or which at 
any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would: 
(1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a state 
which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed 
date; 
(2) Not assist · any such state in manufacturing any nuclear 
weapons. 
b. Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear 
weapon before the agreed date would: 
(1) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear 
weapons; 
(2) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear 
weapons. 
5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions 
a. If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test explosions 
and providing for effective international control had come into force 
prIor to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would 
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become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty 
would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement. 
b. If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the 
entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear weapons test explosions 
would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international 
control would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. 
6. Additional Measures 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining un-
resolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in Stages 
II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons 
stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty 
would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapons stockpiles. 
D. OUTER SPACE 
1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit 
I 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons 
capable of producing mass destruction. 
2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support increased inter-
national cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United 
Nations or through other appropriate arrangements. 
3. Notification and Pre-launch Inspection 
With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles: 
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launchings of 
space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such 
launchings to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International 
Disarmament Organization together with the track of the space 
vehicle or missile. Such advance notification would be provided on 
a timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space vehicle 
or missile to be launched. 
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in 
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization 
would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles 
and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for 
detecting unreported launchings. 
4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities 
The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space 
vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. Such activities 
would be monitored by the International Disarmament Organization 
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in accordance with arrangements which would be set forth In the 
annex on verification. 
E. MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
1. Report on Expenditures 
The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International 
Disarmament Organization at the end of each step of each stage a 
report on their military expenditures. Such reports would include 
an itemization of military expenditures. 
2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine questions related 
to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures. In the light of 
this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would consider appropriate 
arrangements respecting military expenditures. 
F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR 
In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war, the' 
Parties to the Treaty would agree to the following measures: 
1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Maneuvers 
Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of 
major military movements and maneuvers to other Parties to the 
Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific 
arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of 
movements and maneuvers to be reported and the information to be 
transmitted, would be agreed. 
2. Observation Posts 
Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to 
be established at agreed locations, including major ports, ~ailway 
centers, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on 
concentrations and movernents of military forces. The number of 
such posts could be progressively expanded in each successive step 
of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, 
including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving 
and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts 
would be agreed. 
3. Additional Observation Arrangements 
The Parties to the Treaty would establish such additional observa-
tion arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be 
extended in an agreed manner during each step of Stage I. 
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4. Exchange of Military Missions 
Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of 
military missions between states or groups of states in order to improve 
communications and understanding between them. Specific arrange-
ments respecting such exchanges would be agreed. 
5. Communications Between Heads of Government 
Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of 
rapid and reliable communications amoI;lg their heads of government 
and with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Specific 
arrangements in this regard would be subject to agreement among the 
Parties concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary General. 
6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War 
The Parties to the Treaty would establish an International Com-
mission on Reduction of the Risk of War as a subsidiary body of the 
International Disarmament Organization to examine and make 
recommendations regarding further measures that might be under-
taken during Stage I or subsequent stages of disarmament to reduce 
the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, 
or surprise attack. Specific. arrangements for such measures as might 
be agreed to by all or some of the Parties to the Treaty would be 
subject to agreement among the Parties concerned. 
G. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT 
ORGANIZATION 
1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization 
The International Disarmament Organization would be established 
upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would function within the 
framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the Treaty. 
2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to cooperate promptly and 
fully with the International Disarmament Organization and to assist 
the International Disarmament Organization in the performance of its 
functions and in the e~ecution of the decisions made by it in accordance 
with the provisions of the Treaty. 
3. Verification Functions of the International Disarmament Organization 
The International Disarmament Organization would verify dis-
armament measures· in accordance with the following principles which 
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would be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the 
annex on verification: 
a. Measures providing for reduction of armaments would be verified 
by the International Disarmament Organization at agreed depots and 
would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where 
appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful 
uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be 
verified by the International Disarmament Organization either at the 
agreed depots or o.ther agreed locations. 
b. Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and other 
specified activities would be verified by the International Disarmament 
Organization. Parties ·to the Treaty would declare the nature and 
location of all production and testing facilities and other specified 
activities. The International Disarmament Organization would have 
access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the terri-
tory of such Parties. 
c. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces 
were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the 
Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided 
by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed 
arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the 
extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the 
amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to 
the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. . This might be ac-
complished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features 
as the following: 
(1) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the Treaty to 
which this form of verification was applicable would be subj ect to 
selection for inspection from the beginning of Stage I as provided 
below. 
(2) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an 
agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step 
of disarmament would submit to the International Disarmament 
Organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, 
and specified types of activities subject to verification within each 
zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would 
not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection. 
(3) An agreed number of these zones would be progressively 
inspected by the International Disarmament Organization during 
Stage I according to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be 
inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their 
selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory 
was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. Upon selection 
of each zone, the Party to the Treaty whose territory was to be in-
spected would declare the exact location of armaments, forces and 
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other agreed activities within the selected zone. During the verifica-
tion process, arrangements would be made to provide assurance against 
undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone 
or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection 
would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as 
agreed measures being verified were conc~rned, access within the zone 
would be free and unimpeded, and verification would be carried out 
with the full cooperation of the state being inspected. 
(4) Once a zone had been i~spected it would remain open for 
further inspection while verification was being extended to additional 
zones. 
(5) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had 
been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of 
the territory of Parties to the Treaty. 
4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization 
a. The International Disarmament Organization would have: 
(1) A General Conference of all the Parties to the Treaty; 
(2) A Control Council consis.ting of representatives of all the 
major signatory powers as permanent members and certain other 
Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis; and 
(3) An Administrator who would administer the International 
Disarmament Organization under .the direction of the Control Council 
and who would have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to 
ensure effective and impartial implementation of the functions of the 
International Disarmament Organization. 
b. The General Conference and the Control Council would have 
power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study 
groups,. as either of them might deem necessary. 
5. Functions of the General Conference 
The General Conference would have the following functions, among 
others which might be agreed: 
a. Electing non-permanent members to the ·Control Council; 
b. Approving certain accessions to the Treaty; 
c. Appointing the Administrator upon recommendation of the 
Con trol Council; ,--,n 
d. Approving agreements between the International Disarmament 
Organization and the United Nations and other international 
organizations; 
e. Approving the budget of the International Disarmament 
Organization; 
f. Requesting and receiving reports from the Control Council and 
deciding upon matters referred. to it by the Control Council; 
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g. Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United 
Nations; 
h. Proposing matters for consideration by the Control Council; 
i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory 
opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations; 
j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible ratification by 
the Parties to the Treaty; 
k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty 
or disarmament in general. 
6. Functions of the Control Council 
The Control Council would have the following functions, among 
others which might be agreed: 
a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator; 
b . Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the Treaty; 
c. Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and 
operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining supervi-
sion over such arrangements and the Administrator; 
d. Establishing procedures for making available to the Parties to 
the Treaty data produced by verification arrangements; 
e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the progress of 
disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation 
and operation of the verification arrangements; 
f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the budget.of the 
International Disarmament Organization; 
g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory 
opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or appli-
cation of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations; 
h. Recommending to the Conference approval of certain accessions 
to the Treaty; 
i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty 
or to disarmament in general. 
7. Functions of the Administrator 
The Administrator would have the following functions, among 
others which might be agreed: 
a. Administering · the installation and operation of the verification 
arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive Officer of the Interna-
tional Disarmament Organization; 
b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by 
the verification arrangements; 
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c. Preparing the budget of the International Disarmament 
Organization; 
d. Making reports to the Control Council on the progresf? of dis-
armament measures and of their verification, and on the installation 
and operation of the verification arrangements. 
8. Privileges and Immunities 
The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the Treaty 
would grant to the International Disarmament Organization and 
its staff and to the representatives of the Parties to the International 
Disarmament Organization, and the legal capacity which the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization should enjoy in the territory 
of each of the Parties to the Treaty would be specified in an annex 
to the Treaty. 
9. Relations with the United Nations and Other International Organizations 
a. The International Disarmament Organization, being established 
within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its 
activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements 
with the United N a.tions, and the Administrator of the International 
Disarmament Organization would consult with the Secretary General 
of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest. 
b. The Control Council of the International Disarmament Organ-
ization would transmit to the United Nations annual and other 
reports on the activities of the International Disarmament Organ-
ization. 
c. Principal organs of the United Nations could make recommenda-
tions to the International Disarmament Organization, which would 
consider them and report to the United Nations on action taken. 
NOTE: The above outline does not cover all the possible details 
or aspects of relationships between the International Disarmament 
Organization and the United Nations. 
H. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS 
FOR KEEPING THE PEACE 
1. Obligations Concerning the Threat or Use of Force 
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, 
in their international relations, from the threat or use of for.ce of 
any type-including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological 
means of warfare-contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United N a tioDs Charter. 
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2. Rules of I ntemational Conduct 
a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a 
subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of 
the codification and progressive development of rules of international 
conduct related to disarmament. 
b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from indirect aggression 
and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in subparagraph a 
would also study methods of assuring states against indirect aggres-
sion or subversion. 
3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appropriate processes 
for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between 
them and any other state, whether or not a Party to the Treaty, 
including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, 
submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice. 
b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes concerning 
the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled 
by negotiation or by the International Disarmament Organization 
would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on 
another mode of settlement. 
c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under 
the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which 
should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in 
nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrange-
ments where needed. 
4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security 
The Parties t.o the Treaty would agree to surport measures strength-
ening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations 
so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and 
security. 
5. United Nations Peace Force 
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrange-
ments during Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United 
Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would 
agree on the following measures within the United Nations: 
a. Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to 
a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the 
peace; 
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b. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agree-
ments envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter; 
c. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United 
Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose, 
mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, 
training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments. 
6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support the establishment 
within the United Nations of a Peace Observation Corps, staffed with 
a standing cadre of observers who could be despatched promptly to 
investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a 
breach of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps 
could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout 
the world. 
I. TRANSITION 
1. Transition from Stage I to Stage I I would take place at the end of Stage 1, 
upon a determination that the following circumstances existed: 
a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had been carried 
out. 
b. All preparations required for Stage II had been made; and 
c. All militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty. 
2. During the last three months of Stage I, the Control Council would review 
the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining 
whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage I. 
3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control 
Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the 
agreed period of Stage I would, upon the request of such permanent 
member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more 
than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circum-
stances. 
4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the 
permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the fore-
going circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before 
a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage I I would 
take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing 
circumstances did in fact exist. 
Stage II 
Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I and would 
be completed within three years from that date. 
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During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake: 
1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage I; 
2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced 
during Stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament 
in the manner outlined below; 
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization 
would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations 
undertaken during Stage II; and 
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace 
through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and 
through the additional measures outlined below. 
A. ARMAMENTS 
1. Reduction of Armaments 
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage I reduced 
their armaments in agreed categories by thirty percent would during 
Stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories 
listed in Section A, subparagraph 1.b of Stage I by fifty percent of 
the inventory existing at the end of Stage I. 
b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to meas-
ures for the reduction of armaments during Stage I would submit to 
the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declara-
tion respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed 
in Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of Stage II. 
Such Parties to the Trea~y would during Stage II reduce the inventory 
of each type of such armaments by sixty-five percent in order that 
such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction 
by the end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties 
to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by thirty percent 
in Stage I. 
2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction 
a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International 
Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories 
existing at the beginning of Stage II pf the additional types of arma-
ments in the categories listed in -subparagraph b below, and would 
during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such arma.ments 
by fifty percent. 
b . All types of armaments within further agreed categories would 
be subject to reduction in Stage II (the following list of categories is 
illustrative) : 
(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 
2,500 kilograms (declarati~ns by types). 
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(2) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declarations 
by types). 
(3) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 
kilometers (declarations by types). 
(4) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of less than 
100 mm. (declarations by types). 
(5) Specified types of unarmored personnel carriers and transport 
vehicles (declarations by types). 
(6) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons 
or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed 
in Stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of 
less than 400 tons (declarations by types). 
(7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations 
by types). 
(8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types). 
c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in 
Stage I, Section A, subparagraph l.b and in subparagraph b above 
would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments 
agreed for the end of Stage II. 
3. Method of Reduction 
The foregoing measures wo uld be carried out and would be verified 
by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner cor-
responding to that provided for in Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2. 
4. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities 
a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of arma-
ments in the specified categories except for production, within 
agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained 
armaments. 
b. The production of ammunition in specified categories would be 
reduced to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments 
agreed for the end of Stage II. 
c. The Parties to the Treaty would halt development and testing 
of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of 
missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas. 
d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in 
the annex on verification, the In terna tional Disarmament Organiza-
tion would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and 
would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing 
measures were not conducted at undeclared locations. 
5. Additional Measures 
a. In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means 
of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production 
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and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruc-
tion, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following meas-
ures respecting such weapons: 
(1) The cessation of all production and field testing of chemical 
and biological weapons of mass destruction. 
(2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical 
and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels fifty percent 
below those existing at the beginning of Stage II. 
(3) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facili-
ties engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and bio-
logical weapons of mass destruction. 
b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed 
sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an 
annex to the Treaty. 
c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in 
the annex on verification the In terna tional Disarmamen t Organization 
would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance 
that retained levels of chemical and biological weapons did not 
exceed agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing 
limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations. 
B. ARMED FORCES 
1. Reduction of Armed Forces 
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures 
providing for reduction of force levels during Stage I would further 
reduce their force levels on the following basis: 
(1) Force levels of the United States of America and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to levels fifty percent 
below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I. 
(2) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which had been 
subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during 
Stage I would be further reduced, on the basis of an agreed percentage, 
below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I to levels which would 
not in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of 
Stage II. 
b. Those Parties to the Treaty which ha,.d not been subject to 
measures providing for the reduction of armed forces during Stage 
I would reduce their force levels to agreed levels consistent with 
those to be reached by other Parties which had reduced their force 
levels during Stage I as well as Stage II. In no case would such agreed 
levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II. 
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c. Agreed levels of armed forces would include all personnel In 
the categories set forth in Section B, paragraph 2 of Stage 1. 
2. Method of Reduction 
The further reduction of force levels would be carried out and 
would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization 
in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Section B, para-
graph 3 of Stage 1. 
3. Additional Measures 
Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels would be 
placed on compulsory military training, and on refresher training 
for reserve forces of the Parties to the Treaty. 
C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons 
In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of 
accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear 
weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to 
reduce in the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and 
fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons: 
a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International 
Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amounts, types 
and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials. 
b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types 
of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to mini-
mum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. The foregoing reduc-
tion would be accomplished through the transfer of such materials 
to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for 
which such materials would be used would be determined by the 
state to which the materials belonged, provided that such materials 
were not used in nuclear weapons. 
c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear com-
ponents and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable 
materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of 
fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons. 
d. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any 
remaining fissionable materials would be subject to agreed limitations. 
e. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed 
sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an 
annex to the Treaty. 
f. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in 
the verification annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament 
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Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared loca-
tions and would provide assurance that activities subject to the 
foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations. 
2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification Purposes 
To facilitate verification during Stage III that no nuclear weapons 
remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty, those Parties 
to the Treaty which possessed nuclear weapons would, during the 
last six months of Stage II, register and serialize their remaining 
nuclear weapons and would register remaining fissionable materials 
for use in such weapons. Such registration and serialization would 
be carried out with the International Disarmament Organization in 
accordance with procedures which would be set forth in the annex 
on verification. 
D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES 
1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities 
The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful 
uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be 
located. 
2. Method of Reduction 
a. The list of military bases and facilities subj ect to the foregoing 
measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or con-
verting them to peaceful uses would be set forth in an -annex to the 
Treaty_ 
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in 
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion would verify the foregoing measures. 
E. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR 
In the light of the examination by the International Commission 
on Reduction of the Risk of War during Stage I the Parties to the 
Treat.y would undertake such additional arrangements as appeared 
desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The 
Parties to the Treaty would also consider extending and improving 
the measures undertaken in Stage I for this purpose. The Commis-
sion would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements 
or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after 
Stage II. 
26 
F. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT 
ORGANIZATION 
The International Disarmament Organization would be strength-
ened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity to verify the 
measures undertaken in Stage II through an extension of the arrange-
ments based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 
of Stage I. 
G. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS 
FOR KEEPING THE PEACE 
1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
a. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted 
during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such addi-
tional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just 
and ' peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or 
political in nature. 
b. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without 
reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that 
Court to decide international legal disputes. 
2. Rules of International Conduct 
a. The Parties to the Treaty would continue their support of the 
study by the subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Or-
ganization initiated in Stage I to study the codification and progres-
sive development of rules of international conduct related to disar-
mament. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment 
of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body 
and approved by the Control Council would be circulated to all 
Parties to the Treaty and would become effective three months there-
after unless a majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their 
disapproval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound 
by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a 
period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the 
International Disarmament Organization that they did not consider 
themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the 
Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to 
disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III. 
b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion 
conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to ar-
rangements necessary to assure states against indirect aggression and 
sUbversion. 
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3. United Nations Peace Force 
The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of 
the agreement reached during Stage I would come into being within 
the first year of Stage II and would be progressively strengthened 
during Stage II. 
4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps 
The Parties to the Treaty 'would conclude arrangements for the 
expansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation 
Corps. 
5. National Legislation 
Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, 
in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national leg-
islation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on indi-
viduals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing 
appropriate penalties for noncompliance. 
H. TRANSITION 
1. Transition from Stage I I to Stage I I I would take place at the end of Stage 
II, upon a determination that the following circumstances existed: 
a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had been carried 
out; 
b. All preparations required for Stage III had been made; and 
c. All states possessing armed forces and armaments had become 
Parties to the Treaty. 
2. During the last three months of Stage I I, the Control Council would review 
the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining at 
the end of Stage I I whether they existed. 
3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control 
Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the 
agreed period of Stage I I would, upon the request of such permanent 
member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more 
than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circum-
stances. 
4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the 
permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the fore-
going circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before 
a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage I I I would take 
place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing 
circumstances did in fact exist. 
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Stage III · 
Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II and would 
be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible. 
During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake: 
1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages I and II; 
2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament 
in the manner outlined below; 
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization 
would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obliga-
tions undertaken during Stage III and of continuing verification 
subsequent to the completion of Stage III; and 
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace 
during and following the achievement of general and complete dis-
armament through the additional measures outlined below. 
A. ARMAMENTS 
1. Reduction of Armaments 
Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed 
types for national forces required to maintain internal order and pro-
tect the personal seturity of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would 
eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of 
Stage II. 
2. Method of Reduction 
a. The foregoing measure would be carried out in an agreed se-
quence and through arrangements that would be set forth in an annex 
to the Treaty. 
b. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the 
annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization 
would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that 
retained armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed 
agreed levels. 
3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities 
a. Subject to agreed arrangements in support of national forces re-
quired to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of 
citizens and subject to agreed arrangements in support of the United 
Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all applied 
research, development, production, and testing of armaments and 
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would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses all facil-
ities for such purposes. 
b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed se-
quence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an 
annex to the Treaty. 
c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in 
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and 
would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing 
measures were not conducted at undeclared locations. 
B. ARMED FORCES 
1. Reduction of Armed Forces 
To the end that upon completion of Stage III they would have at 
their disposal only those forces and organizational arrangements 
necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect 
the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of 
providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force, the 
Parties to the Treaty would complete the reduction of their force 
levels, disband systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded 
organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national 
military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian 
personnel associated with the foregoing. 
2. Method of Reduction 
a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed 
sequence through arrangements which would be set forth in an 
annex to the Treaty. 
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in 
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance 
that the only forces and organizational arrangements retained or 
subsequently established were those necessary for agreed forces 
required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal 
security of citizens and those for providing agreed manpower for the 
United Nations Peace Force. 
3. Other Limitations 
The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and 
would undertake to annul legislation concerning national military 
establishments or military service. inconsistent with the foregoing 
measures. 
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C. NUCLEAR ·WEAPONS 
1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons 
In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt the pro-
duction of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to 
reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would 
eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would 
cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for 
production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remain-
ing at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than 
use in such weapons. 
2. Method of Reduction 
a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed 
sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an 
annex to the Treaty. 
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in 
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance 
that no nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons 
remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no 
such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities. 
D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES 
1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities 
The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful 
uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, 
wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for 
such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to 
the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and 
protect the personal security of citizens. 
2. Method of Reduction 
a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing 
measure and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or con-
verting them to peaceful uses during Stage III would be ·set forth in 
an annex to the Treaty. 
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in 
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion would verify the foregoing measure at declared locations and 
provide assurance that there were no undeclared military bases and 
facilities. 
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E. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY 
SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Reporting Requirement 
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures 
respecting research and development of military significance subse-
quent to Stage III: 
a. The Parties to the Treaty would report to the International 
Disarmament Organization any basic scientific discovery and any 
technological invention having potential military significance. 
b. The Control Council would establish such expert study groups 
as might be required to examine the potential military significance of 
such di~coveries and inventions and, if necessary, to recommend ap-
propriate measures for their control. In the light of such expert 
study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, establish 
agreed arrangements providing for verification by the International 
Disarmament Organization that such discoveries and inventions 
were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would 
become an annex to the Treaty. 
c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate arrange-
ments for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and 
inventions reported to the International Disarmament Organization 
in accordance w~th subparagraph a above. 
2. International Cooperation 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full international 
cooperation in all fields of scientific research and development, and 
to engage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and 
free interchange of views among s-cientific and technical personnel. 
F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR 
1. Improved Measur.es 
In the light of the Stage II examination by the International 
Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War, the Parties to the 
Treaty would undertake such extensions and improvements of exist-
ing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared 
desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The 
Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, im-
provements or additional measures which might be taken during and 
after Stage III. 
2. Application of Measures to Continuing Forces 
The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national forces required 
to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens 
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those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war 
that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II. 
G. INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION 
The International Disarmament Organization would be strength-
ened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity (1) to verify the 
measures undertaken in Stage III through an extension of arrange-
ments based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 
of Stage I so that by the end of Stage III, when all disarmament 
measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended 
to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide 
continuing verification of disarmament after the completion of 
Stage III. 
H. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS 
FOR KEEPING THE PEACE 
1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes 
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional steps 
and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful 
change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful 
settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political 
in nature. 
2. Rules of International Conduct 
The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codification and pro-
gressive development of rules of international conduct related to 
disarmament in the manner provided in Stage II and by any other 
agreed procedure. 
3. United Nations Peace Force 
The Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United 
Nations Peace Force established in Stage II until it had sufficient 
armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it. 
I. COMPLETION OF STAGE III 
1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage I I I, the Control Council 
would review the situation with a view to determining whether all under-
takings to be carried out in Stage I I I had been carried out. 
2. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control 
Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out, 
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the agreed period of Stage I I I would, upon the request of such permanent 
member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more 
than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted under-
takings. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more 
of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such 
undertakings still had not been carried out, the question would be placed 
before a special session of the Security Council, which would determine 
whether Stage III had been completed. 
3. After the completion of Stage I I I, the obligations undertaken in Stages I, 
I I and I I I would continue. ;>0 
General Provisions Applicable 
to All Stages 
1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific procedures for 
considering amendments or modifications of the Treaty which were 
believed desirable by any Party to the Treaty in the ligh t of experience 
in the -early period of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures 
would include provision for a conference on revision of the Treaty 
aft.er a specified period of time. 
2. Interim Agreement 
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific arrange-
ments, including the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, as 
were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the Treaty 
to ensure the initiation of Stage I immediately upon the entry into 
force of the Treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange 
of views and ' information on topics relating to the Treaty and to the 
achievement of a permanent state of general and complete disarma-
ment in a peaceful world. 
3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession, and Entry into Force of 
the Treaty 
s. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or acces-
sion, by all members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies. 
b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to the Treaty 
could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on 
recommendation of the Control Council. 
c. The Treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by 
_____ states, including the United St.ates of America, the Union 
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of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following 
states: 
d. In order to assure the achievement of the fundalnental purpose 
of a permanent state of general and complete disarmarnent. in a peace-
ful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession of certain mili-
tarily significant states would be essential for the continued effective-
ness of the Treaty or for the coming in to force of particular measures 
or stages. 
e. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort 
to induce other states or aut.horities to accede to the Treaty. 
f. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in 
accordance with constitutional processes. 
g. A Depository Government would be agreed upon which would 
have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depository. Al-
ternatively, the United Nations would be the Depository. 
4. Finance 
a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the International 
Disarmament Organization, the Parties to the Treaty would bear 
the International Disarmament Organization's expenses as provided 
in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance 
with a scale of apportionment approved by the General Conference. 
b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on 
behalf of the Internf\tional Disarmament Organization. 
5. Authentic Texts 
The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions 
in English, French, .Russian, Chinese and Spanish. 
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